Stress-testing the big US banks
Morningstar analysts in the US ran their own stress test to discover which of the nation's big banks might need government aid
There has been a lot of speculation about the US Treasury's stress test that banks with more than US$100 billion of assets will be forced to go through over the next two months. With just a little guidance available, we decided to come up with our own stress test to see which banks may look short of capital and which ones are likely to pass the test without the need for back-stop government capital.
Out Test
      With Tier 1 ratios at historic highs, we chose to focus on the tangible 
      common equity/tangible asset ratio (TCE ratio) to determine the strength 
      of the bank. Regulators have not given any guidance on what is an 
      acceptable minimum TCE ratio for a bank, so we used a 3% minimum, which 
      appears to be the minimum acceptable ratio in the market for now. Using 
      our projected earnings numbers, the banks' loan books, and (for some) 
      securities at risk for write-downs, we tried to assess how much stress 
      14 large US banks could take over the next two years before seeking 
      government aid.
    
Like any quick-and-dirty analysis, our stress test will lack the sophistication of the government's much more detailed version and has some obvious weaknesses that need to be understood before using the results. The biggest drawback to this type of exercise is that we needed to standardise it. We use a flat loss rate across the industry despite the meaningful differences in loan portfolio mixes, underwriting standards, and loss recognition policies across the industry. We don't take into account the potential of writing down government-backed securities, positively affecting the outcome for the banks. We do not account for the capital drain of dividends or excess provision-building. We also use a stable pretax, pre-provision, pre-write-down earnings figure for all our scenarios, despite the likelihood that a deeper recession would probably lead to lower net interest margins, lower fee-based revenues, and higher operating costs. We don't give major acquirers (such as J.P. Morgan's purchase of WaMu or Wells Fargo's purchase of Wachovia) any credit for the mark-to-market accounting they used in acquisitions. We also keep the end-of-period balance sheet size stable--despite the obvious correlation between higher write-downs and a shrinking asset base. With these limitations in mind, we still found this exercise useful.
The Failing Banks
      In our opinion, banks that fail to pass the stress test are not in 
      danger of being seized by the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance 
      Corporation). In fact, failing our test does not necessarily even 
      require these banks to raise new capital. It would require the banks to 
      at least negotiate with the government to convert some of the preferred 
      stock received in the first round of the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
      into common stock, which would dilute shareholders. With their current 
      capital cushion and relatively small shortfall we believe that Bank 
      of America, State 
      Street, PNC, 
      and KeyCorp 
      would likely convert existing preferreds into common stock before 
      seeking additional capital. The greater capital need displayed at SunTrust 
      and Fifth 
      Third leads us to believe they will need to seek new capital from 
      the CAP programme and convert some of their existing preferred shares to 
      fill their capital shortfall, forcing the current shareholders to take a 
      much bigger hit. Citigroup 
      took action last week to close its large tangible common equity 
      shortfall, announcing a massive preferred stock conversion that could 
      leave existing shareholders owning only 26% of the bank, while the 
      government's stake could jump to 36% of the beleaguered company.
    
The Passing Banks
      Passing the stress test is definitely good news, but it doesn't prevent 
      the companies from facing significant challenges in the two years ahead. 
      Loan losses and additional securities write-downs are likely to continue 
      throughout 2009 and into 2010. As a result, even the strongest of the 
      banks might be forced to cut their dividends. Not surprisingly, the 
      better-capitalised banks are usually also the banks who were unwilling 
      to take big risks with their balance sheets. We think these banks will 
      both suffer smaller losses and more easily absorb those that do occur. 
      Furthermore, strong banks like JP Morgan, Wells Fargo, US 
      Bancorp, and BB&T 
      will continue to benefit from a flight to quality by bank customers and 
      investors. With strong management and a disciplined culture, these banks 
      are likely to be hurt less in this downturn and stand in the best 
      position to profit from the upheaval in the market in the long run. 
    


